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LEVERAGE AND ASSET BUBBLES: AVERTING
ARMAGEDDON WITH CHAPTER 11?*
Marcus Miller and Joseph Stiglitz
An iconic model with high leverage and overvalued collateral assets is used to illustrate the ampli-
fication mechanism driving asset prices to overshoot equilibrium when an asset bubble bursts –
threatening widespread insolvency and what Richard Koo calls a balance sheet recession. Besides
interest rates cuts, asset purchases and capital restructuring are key to crisis resolution. The usual
bankruptcy procedures for doing this fail to internalise the price effects of asset fire-sales to pay
down debts, however. We discuss how official intervention in the form of super Chapter 11 actions
can help prevent asset price correction causing widespread economic disruption.
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in
your philosophy.
Hamlet
From 2007 to 2009 a chain of events, beginning with unexpected losses in the US
sub-prime mortgage market, was destined to bring the global financial system close to
collapse and to drag the world economy into recession. One of the key challenges
posed by this crisis, says Williamson (2009), is to understand how such major
consequences can flow from such a seemingly minor event. Before describing an
amplification mechanism involving overpriced assets and excessive leverage, we begin
by looking, albeit briefly, at what the current macroeconomic paradigm may have to
say.
The canonical New Keynesian ⁄New Classical macroeconomic model, as outlined
in Woodfords (2003) Interest and Prices for example, focuses on using interest rates
to control inflation in a setting where the private sector optimises inter-temporally
but wages and prices are relatively inflexible. Under the convenient assumption of a
representative agent with rational expectations, credit flows and leverage are left
out of the picture, however. As Bean (2009) ruefully observes in his Schumpeter
lecture to the EEA, there are no financial frictions to speak of, [and] financial
intermediation plays a negligible role in Mike Woodfords magisterial state-of-the-art
opus.
Even when heterogeneity as between lenders and borrowers is taken into account,
and some financial friction – in the form of a wedge or spread between the rate
charged to borrowers and that paid to lenders – is introduced, the key policy
implications are not much changed, it seems, as long as the spread is accommodated by
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prompt adjustment in policy rates. What Cu´rdia and Woodford had to say at the Bank
of International Settlements in June 2008 was summarised by the Chief Economist at
the IMF as follows: The effects of a worsening of financial intermediation, they tell us,
are likely to be limited. Changes in the wedge have important distribution effects, but
small aggregate effects. Monetary policy still works. Indeed, optimal monetary policy
remains simple (Blanchard, 2008).
Others were less sanguine: the experience of Japan in the 1990s, for instance,
led Koo (2008) to warn that the credit crunch would be followed by a protracted
process of de-leveraging and that radical policy easing was needed to combat a balance
sheet recession.1 The actual response of monetary and fiscal policy has in fact been
dramatic – including near-zero policy rates and extraordinary official intervention to
prevent the collapse of the financial system, amounting to around three quarters of
GDP in the UK and US for example.
This may be, as the Governor of the Bank of Japan suggested at the Jackson Hole
conference, a good time to review the prevailing philosophy in the light of the current
crisis (Shirakawa 2009). The Wicksellian perspective that Woodford advocates has
surely freed monetary economics from some of the simpler nostrums of Friedmans
Monetarism; but the macroeconomic models it has encouraged central bankers to
use – with their representative agents, rational expectations, small shocks, missing
banking sector, etc. – seem to miss the point: that things can suddenly go badly wrong
so that emergency measures are needed to avert Armageddon.
To see how the economy works during times of stress and financial instability
would ideally involve weaving financial intermediation more carefully into the
existing framework, including incentive distortions and information frictions
(Bean, 2009). Some of the consequences of credit inter-linkages and their policy
implications – including circumstances that render monetary policy ineffective –
have been analysed in Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003); and Gai et al. (2008) have
studied systemic crisis in a setting with intermediaries. But, even without interme-
diaries, a credit-constrained market economy – where collateral is used to handle
repudiation risk – can exhibit liquidity crises and asset price crashes (Geanakoplos,
2003).
How to get something big from something small: that is surely the issue. Like
Krishnamurthy (forthcoming), we focus on the amplification mechanism present in
balance sheet models.2 For the purpose at hand – to study the dangers posed by
excessive leverage and how capital restructuring may be needed to avert economic
collapse when an asset bubble bursts – we make use of a stripped-down framework of
heterogeneous agents with explicit credit constraints but no intermediaries. As an
iconic representation of an economy where shocks are amplified, we turn to the model
of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) where productive small businesses borrow from wealth-
owners with deep pockets who face diminishing returns. Debts are secured by
collateral but the collateral requirements generate significant externalities so aggregate
shocks have persistent effects. Though the framework has non-contingent debt
1 Wolf (2009) comments of Koos book: His big point, though simple, is ignored by conventional
economics: balance sheets matter.
2 He warns too of the onset of Knightian uncertainty in a crisis.
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contracts, this approach has subsequently been extended to allow for state-dependence
(Krishnamurthy, 2003; Lorenzoni 2008).3
An asset bubble is included, and its collapse is the aggregate shock threatening
large scale default – with assets being transferred to the less productive but deep-
pockets agents. As this is clearly inefficient for the economy as a whole, there
should be room for renegotiation of contracts. Usually this would be taken care by
the bankruptcy courts – under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code in the case of the
US. But the law is essentially designed for idiosyncratic events in which assets may
be disposed of at going market prices. In the face of a macroeconomic shock, a
bankruptcy judge can hardly be expected to understand that what would be good
for a specific case (e.g. sale of some assets), could, if generally implemented in
many similar cases, trigger a collapse in prices: there will be a pecuniary externality
that is not taken into account.
Since it is not obvious that micro bankruptcy law will offer an efficient outcome
from a macro perspective, there is a case for a super Chapter 11 approach, to sub-
stitute for procedures usually employed in common bankruptcy law by imposing similar
remedies on a macro scale, so as to internalise the externalities caused in the event of a
re-sale of assets. Capital restructuring and asset purchasing facilities are discussed in
this light.
Our results are consistent with the conclusion of Cu´rdia and Woodford (2008) in
that big interest rate cuts can, in principle, help to minimise the consequences of this
type of financial shock. But there are amplification mechanisms working through
balance sheets and asset prices that are missing from standard macroeconomic models.
If the shock is big enough, interest rate policy alone will not pack enough punch to
avert collapse and the monetary authorities may be stymied by agency problems as
intermediaries fail to intermediate.
In conclusion, official data on financial support measures undertaken in the UK and
US from 2007–2009 are briefly discussed from the balance sheet perspective taken in
this article.
1. Asset Allocation and Pricing with Credit Constraints
In the framework of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), hereafter KM, heterogeneity of tastes
and technology as between borrowers and lenders plays a central role. Borrowers are
relatively impatient, poor but highly productive small businesses who want to acquire
capital assets (land) as a factor of production;4 patient wealth-owners with deep
pockets but declining marginal productivity, are willing to finance small businesses by
supplying them with short-term, roll-over funding on a fully-collateralised basis. The
reason for the collateral constraint is repudiation risk: the idiosyncratic skill of small
businesses entrepreneurs is non-contractible and cannot be taken over by the creditor
3 Even with state-contingent contracts, however, Lorenzoni shows that the combination of debtors who
must post collateral and a lack of insurance against aggregate shocks still leaves room for significant pecuniary
externalities – with inefficient credit booms leading to excessive collateral price adjustments.
4 KM label the borrowers farmers but in the present context it seems more appropriate to think of them as
small businesses; in the UK, for example, small and medium-sized enterprises employ more than half the
workforce in the private sector.
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in payment of debt. It is assumed that the fixed endowment of land is always fully
employed: by whom is the issue.
Before turning to detail, we sketch the process of land acquisition by small businesses
(SBs), starting from an initial holding below equilibrium (kt1 < k* ). The horizontal
line in Figure 1 shows the (constant) marginal productivity of land, a, in the SB sector
while the upward-sloping line ZE indicates the user cost of land, its discounted pro-
ductivity in the other sector (whose holdings will be k  kt).
The flow of profits accruing to the small businesses on initial land holdings, akt1, are
used to expand production. As land prices reflect the lower productivity of wealth
owners – and not the relatively higher productivity of small businesses – current profits
(used as a down payment on borrowing to acquire more land) permit an expansion of
holdings, as is shown by the hyperbola XX through A which intersects the user cost
schedule at A0. (Land holding in periods t + 1 can likewise be found using X 0X 0.) The
fact that SB net worth, ak, increases step-by-step as k approaches k* from below reflects
the fact that, with credit rationing, there is delay in exploiting the relatively higher
productivity of assets in this sector.
1.1. The Amplification Mechanism: Micro-foundations
Before considering what happens when an asset bubble collapses, consider how things
evolve with perfect foresight, starting with small businesses who borrow up to the hilt
and happily postpone consumption of traded goods to some later date.5 Their flow of
funds accounts show land holdings, denoted kt, evolving as:
Land Accumulation ¼ Income þ Net Borrowing
or, in symbols,
SB Productivity



















Fig. 1. Not So Fast: Credit-constrained Expansion by Small Businesses
5 For simplicity, the production and current consumption of non-traded goods by credit-constrained
agents in the original model is omitted here.
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qtðkt  kt1Þ ¼ akt1 þ bt  Rbt1 ð1Þ
where bt is the amount of one-period borrowing to be repaid as Rbt (R is one plus the
one-period interest rate), qt is price of land, and a measures the productivity of land in
this sector.
Non-contractibility imposes limits on borrowing: and debt contracts secured on land
are the only financial instruments that creditors can rely on.6 This puts a strict upper
limit on the amount of external finance that can be raised: so the rate of expansion of
the small businesses is determined not by their inherent earning power but by their
ability to acquire collateral.
The credit constraint, assumed to bind at all times, is that borrowing gross of interest
matches the expected value of land, i.e.
bt ¼ Et qtþ1kt=R : ð2Þ
As the degree of leverage is keyed to expectations of future prices, there will be more
lending when capital gains are in prospect – as was true for sub-prime lending
according to Gorton (2008). This will be crucial when an asset bubble is considered.
But with perfect foresight of future land values, substitution into (1) yields an accu-
mulation equation for small businesses who use all their net worth to make down
payments on land, namely:
ðqt  qtþ1=RÞkt ¼ akt1 ð3Þ
where the expression in parentheses on the left is the down-payment required to
purchase a unit of land and the term on the right measures both the productivity of
those resources in this sector and SB net worth.7
As for deep-pocket investors, they equalise expected returns from using land as a
productive asset themselves and from lending (on a secured basis) at the rate of
interest R, so
f 0ðktÞ þ Etqtþ1  qt ¼ ðR  1Þqt ð4Þ
where f 0(kt) is the marginal productivity of land in the unconstrained sector (expressed
as a function of kt the amount of land in the constrained sector as in Figure 1 above,
assuming the total amount of land is fixed).8
This arbitrage condition can be rewritten to show how the down payment by the
borrower has to match the user cost of land:
qt  qtþ1=R ¼ f 0ðktÞ=R ¼ uðktÞ: ð5Þ
Where u(kt) is the discounted marginal productivity of land for deep-pocketed
investors (where there is also a one period lag in production).
6 Simple rental contracts are excluded because tenants may face a hold up problem if they add investment
of their own – as KM assume later in the article cited.
7 By definition, the net worth of property companies at the beginning of date t is the value of tradable
output and land held from the previous period, net of debt repayment, i.e. (a + qt)ktl  Rbtl = aktl.
8 Note that, with fixed total endowment k and diminishing returns in production in the unconstrained
sector where output is g ðk  ktÞ, defining f 0ðkt Þ ¼ g 0ðkkt Þimplies that f 0 0 =  g 0 0 > 0 i.e. small businesses
face a rising cost of acquiring land.
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The simple dynamics of asset accumulation by small businesses indicated in Figure 1
comes from substituting (5) into (3) to give:
uðktÞkt ¼ akt1 ð6Þ
where the absence of asset prices in (6) reflects the assumption of perfect foresight.
For analytical simplicity, assume (as in Figure 1) that the user cost of land for small
businesses is linearly related to their collective holdings kt, so:
uðktÞ ¼ ðb0 þ bktÞ=R ð7Þ
where b corresponds to the second derivative of the production function in the
unconstrained sector, i.e. measures the rate of decline in the marginal productivity of
land used by deep pocket investors, and the discount factor 1 ⁄R reflects a one-period
lag in production. As for the price of land, this is determined by deep pocket investors





where this is measured along the path towards equilibrium.
1.2. Amplification and Persistence: Macro-dynamics
To summarise, with current profits used to pay the user cost, asset allocation and prices
in the absence of shocks evolve as follows:
ðb0 þ bktþ1Þktþ1=R ¼ akt ð9Þ
qtþ1 ¼ Rqt  ðb0 þ bktÞ ð10Þ
The recursive structure – so it seems that land prices do not affect the process of
acquisition – depends crucially on the assumption of perfect foresight, however.
Accumulation will be affected by errors of forecast in prices, as we see presently.
The accumulation process has two points of stationarity. There is a stable equilib-
rium, k ¼ (Ra  b0) ⁄b, q  ¼ (b0 + bk ) ⁄ (R  1), where land is allocated efficiently in
terms of its productivity. There is another, inefficient and unstable, equilibrium, k ¼
0, q  ¼ b0 ⁄ (R  1), where credit-constrained small businesses have lost all their
property. A key issue is whether there are forces which might throw the system into the
inefficient equilibrium, at least for a while.










where k ¼ Ra
b0 þ 2bk
<1 is the stable root and the variables are measured from
equilibrium (so k0t ¼ kt  k). The path of adjustment to equilibrium is shown
schematically as SS in Figure 2, where actual outturns will be discrete points because of
the discrete time formulation.
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The unstable eigenvector is vertical: but the slope of the stable path, effectively a
weighted average of productivity in the two sectors, is
h ¼ b
R  k > 0: ð12Þ
The parameter h measures the sensitivity of land prices to fully anticipated transfers of
ownership between the two sectors: but what if there is an aggregate shock?
Assuming the system is in equilibrium at E, the immediate effect of a technology
shock (in the form of a temporary increase in productivity for all small businesses) is
shown in Figure 2 by the intersection of the initial condition QQ, specified algebra-
ically below, with the stable path SS. As the Figure suggests, the impact on land
allocation has two components. The distance EA, measured horizontally from equi-
librium to the initial condition QQ, indicates how far small businesses could expand
at a constant land price, as they go on the acquisition trail using the extra profits as
down-payment on fresh borrowing. Because all businesses are doing the same, however,
the price of land will increase, raising borrower net worth and allowing for more
acquisitions. This is the financial accelerator that takes short-run equilibrium from
A to point B on SS. From there, in the absence of fresh shocks, the system will gradually
return to equilibrium along the stable path.
1.3. The Initial Condition – The Acquisition Schedule
To take account of the positive productivity shock, small business net worth in (8) must
be corrected for the error of forecast. So, at the time of the shock, kt and qt must satisfy
























Fig. 2. Stable Convergence: Amplified Shocks
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where D is the common productivity shock. On the left is the opportunity cost of land kt
used by SBs (the user cost times quantity held): on the right the corrected net worth of
the small businesses in aggregate.
Given the linearisation, this initial condition can be recast as
ðb0 þ 2bkÞk0t =R ¼ a=kð Þk0t ¼ ðDþ q0t Þk ð14Þ
where the variables are now measured from equilibrium and the term q0t k
 indicates the
presence of a financial accelerator. This implies that
k0t ¼ ðDþ q0t Þc ð15Þ
where c ¼ kk=a, which is the upward-sloping schedule QQ in Figure 2 – the
acquisition schedule of highly-levered players unexpectedly flush with fresh
funds.
2. A Bursting Bubble, De-leveraging and Potential Collapse
2.1. Asset Bubbles
While the Real Business Cycle literature is concerned with technology shocks, our
focus – like Koo (2008) in his account of the Japanese experience – is on aggregate
financial shocks, a negative asset-price correction in particular. Instead of unanticip-
ated profits triggering acquisitions, balance sheet write-downs will trigger liquidation.
How plausible is it to postulate a large, collective error of forecast of this kind?
Standard neoclassical theory precludes the existence of bubbles: so does the efficient
markets hypothesis. As Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) demonstrate, however, the
backwards induction argument typically used to rule out bubbles fails if people dis-
agree. Lack of common knowledge – in the form, say, of dispersed beliefs about when a
bubble will end – can be sufficient to generate its persistence.
To account for the existence of the bubble in US house prices that peaked in 2006,
Shiller (2008, p. 62) took a behavioural perspective – observing that people try to think
of speculative events as rational responses to information. . . [and] accept as simple fact
the stories that accompany the bubble. So, too, does Laibson (2010), in his Hahn
Lecture to the Royal Economic Society – with extrapolation of beliefs and trend-
chasing, wishful-thinking and over-confidence, plus the phenomenon of so-called
social proof, all cited as relevant factors.
Inflated asset prices can often be rationalised by plausible stories of anticipated
fundamentals. Say, in the current context, there is news of a potential technological
improvement for small businesses which promises higher productivity (i.e. higher a)
and a greater share of resources for that sector. With the expectation of widespread
implementation at a later time T, the asset price should jump on the news, with land
allocation shifting from E to A on the acquisition schedule QQ and increase steadily
thereafter towards the higher value stable path S 0S 0 associated with the a 0 > a along
the integral curve shown in Figure 3. But what if, when the asset price has reached B at
time T  1 and all small businesses are set for expansion next period, the promised
implementation fails to occur?
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There will be a nasty shock common to small businesses as asset prices fall and
their balance sheets are marked-to-market: they have, by assumption, been borrowing
the discounted value of land one period ahead, and will be loaded-up with debt
without the anticipated flow of income needed to service it. Liquidation not acquisi-
tion will now be their mantra as they try to pay down their debts.9 The fire-sales will
add to the downward pressure on land prices as the financial accelerator goes into
reverse. There will, effectively, be an increased demand for liquidity (as suggested by
the disposal schedule DD drawn through B in the Figure and discussed further
below). The asset price correction may well overshoot: could it lead to widespread
insolvency?
2.2. Firesales and the Prospect of Insolvency
For analytical convenience, consider the canonical case of price overvaluation when
land holdings are at k*, i.e. the bubble path is the unstable eigenvector that passes
vertically through E; and the size of the bubble is measured by the excess above E of
points at points such as B or B0. At equilibrium, E, all revenues are used to pay interest
on debt; so interest payments on the bubble path are partly covered by fresh borrowing,
as in a Ponzi scheme.10 The ending of the bubble will clearly pose a liquidity problem
and may threaten insolvency, as indicated by the initial conditions, labelled DD, D 0D 0






































Fig. 3. False Dawn: a Bubble as Collective Illusion
9 So long as the shock comes after they have put in their labour and committed their net worth, small
businesses cannot unilaterally bargain a debt write-down: so – like US farmers in the Great Depression – they
will try to sell assets to pay down their debts.





ð1 RÞR ¼ ak
; above E, where q > q*, interest charges exceed current revenue.
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How are these initial conditions defined? Allowing for an adverse price shock again
involves correcting the net worth in (8) for the error of forecast, so kt and qt are
implicitly defined by
ðb0 þ bktÞkt=R ¼ ½a ðqb  qtÞk ¼ ½a ðqb  qÞ  ðq  qtÞk ð16Þ
together with pricing equation (11) above. Given the linearisation, this initial condition
can be rewritten as
b0 þ 2bkð Þk0t =R ¼ a=kð Þk0t ¼  qb  q
 þ q0t k ¼ Dþ hk0t k ð17Þ
where (qb  q)k = D is the absolute size of the net worth correction for excess
borrowing and q0t k
 ¼ hk0t k is the financial accelerator due to fire-sales that this
induces. Defining c ¼ kk=a as before, this can be written as
k0t ¼ ðDþ q0t Þc ð18Þ
defining the disposal schedules shown DD, D0D0 in Figure 4.
These schedules for asset disposal by small businesses can be interpreted as an
unexpected need for liquidity on their part (Krishnamurthy, forthcoming). From this
perspective, asset prices have to fall until the balance-sheet-driven demand for liquidity
by small businesses (measured to the left from k* to DD, for example) is matched by the
supply of liquidity by the residual buyers of land who have no balance sheet problems
(the agents with deep pockets) whose take-up of land is measured from k to SS.





























Fig. 4. Aftermath of an Asset Bubble
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In his discussion of amplification through balance sheets and asset prices,
Krishnamurthy assumes that the overshooting will not be severe enough to render the
illiquid agents insolvent: so equilibrium might be reached at a point such as X, with
asset price such as qX, where prompt de-leveraging permits stable convergence back to
E. According to Koo (2008, pp. 14,15), however, de-leveraging made many firms
technically insolvent in Japan after the bubble burst, a situation which we can represent
by the disposal schedule D 0D 0 (associated with the collapse of a larger asset bubble)
which fails to intersect SS to the right of SC, the Solvency Constraint.
2.3. The Solvency Constraint
How this constraint may be determined can be seen with reference to Figure 5, where
each side of (16) is plotted separately, using the version linearised around equilibrium,
so the opportunity cost of land ðb0 þ 2bkÞk0t =R is shown as OO .
In the absence of shocks, the aggregate net worth of credit-constrained businesses
will lie on the line NN passing through the origin with slope a (with the steps A, B, C,
converging to equilibrium at E with net worth of ak* as described earlier with reference
to Figure 1). Where land holdings of k have become overvalued, however, an asset
price correction will reduce net worth, as debt contracted beforehand exceeds the
value of the collateral assets at the equilibrium price. This adverse balance sheet effect
is shown by D, the distance EF in the figure. But net worth will also be reduced by asset
price overshooting due to fire-sales. The schedule incorporating both these effects is
shown as FF 11 with slope h, where the overshooting term is given by the approximation






Opportunity  Cost 
θ


















Fig. 5. Net Worth, Fire-sales and the Prospect of Widespread Insolvency
11 That the net worth function FF slopes downward to the left in the Figure shows how the volume of
fire-sales drives down the price.
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zero, identifies the Solvency Constraint, labelled SC here and in Figure 4. As this would
imply losses of hkk due to fire-sales, it implies that D ¼ ða khÞk is the largest
financial hit consistent with the solvency of small business enterprise without inter-
vention.12
In fact, highly leveraged borrowers can very easily become insolvent. If their net
worth were only 5% of assets held as collateral for loans, a correction of asset prices in
excess of this would be enough to wipe out their net worth – even before fire-sales
begin. (The system becomes a good deal more robust, however, when borrowers are
subject to a prudential margin requirement which provides an ex ante buffer against
such losses (Edison et al., 2000; Gai et al., 2008): with dynamic provisioning, the shock
to net worth will be cushioned by this buffer.13)
As Koo describes it, the collapse of an economy-wide asset bubble could be the
economic equivalent of the collapse of a supernova – with the black hole of
insolvency threatening to swallow whole sectors of an over-leveraged economy. The
consequences of technical insolvency were seen as so severe,14 indeed, that a pre-
emptive strategy of concealing the true balance sheet position was apparently
widespread in Japan.15
3. Averting the Threat of Mass Insolvency
Wholesale reallocation of assets to relatively unproductive, deep pocket lenders
would obviously be socially inefficient. What can be done to avert it (assuming assets
are marked-to-market, so concealment is not an option)? One way is through a cut
in interest rates: if it is big enough, and if the situation is not too dire, this could
boost asset prices and prevent the net worth of borrowers falling too much, giving
an equilibrium without default, albeit at very discounted asset prices. Another way is
through an explicit capital restructuring in which leverage is reduced, either by
capital injections, debt–equity swaps, or simple debt forgiveness. The problem of
capital restructuring is that the presence of externalities implies the need for some
macro-agency (essentially some government-sponsored institution) that would con-
solidate the troubled businesses and decide simultaneously (and this is the key) how
all of them would be resolved in a common procedure, whether through capital
injections by this agency or agency-sponsored debt–equity swaps. The key is that
12 Note that, for b0 > 0, the user cost will always be non-negative, so the linearity of the schedule OO in
the Figure is potentially misleading. Without linearising, the maximum sustainable aggregate shock can be
found as a limiting point of intersection between the net worth schedule FF and the (non-linear) opportunity
cost schedule, as in Edison et al.(2000).
13 If, for example, prudential margin requirements are suspended after the shock – leaving only the
down-payments as described above – the initial equilibrium for kt may be found as before, except that the
shock D will be net of the prudential margin held beforehand. Silonov (2008) looks at dynamic margins in
this context.
14 If it becomes known that a borrower is technically insolvent, loans extended to the company will
become bad loans and the lender will be forced by government regulators to cut off credit, and try to collect
on existing loans (Koo, 2008, p. 44).
15 Only the executives who borrowed the money and the bankers who lent it truly understand the
problem. But since neither will ever reveal this information to outsiders, external observers remain wholly
oblivious to the situation (Koo, 2008, p. 45).
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some agency should resolve most problems in a single take, to internalise the re-sale
consequences of individual cases. As it not only has to be big enough but also to
have greater powers of enforcement than private creditors, that probably calls for
the hand of the government. A third way is for the government to purchase the
assets themselves, supplying liquidity to prevent asset prices from collapsing. We
consider these actions, starting with asset purchase.
3.1. Asset Purchase by Government Agencies
Agencies of government can check the collapse of asset prices by acting as buyer of last
resort. (Figure 4 shows how buying at a floor price of qX will prevent insolvency after
a bubble bursts at B 0, for example.) The authorities effectively augment the supply of
liquidity so that de-leveraging can take place without causing insolvency. This was, it
seems, the idea behind the original Paulson plan in the US.
3.2. Capital Restructuring: Chapter 11 Procedures
When the going concern value of small businesses after restructuring exceeds the
alternative user cost, the principles of bankruptcy law confirm that they should be kept
going; and in the US, for example, Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code aims at
restructuring the balance sheet so as to avoid premature liquidation. The customary
legal procedures are, however, designed to handle small, idiosyncratic shocks – not
macro shocks hitting the whole economy. Judges can hardly be expected to take
account of externalities imposed by fire-sales of the assets involved in individual cases,
making outright liquidation much more likely.
Internalising the price effects of asset fire-sales in the midst of a crisis requires an
override of normal restructuring procedures – what we refer to as super Chapter 11
actions, where the principles of bankruptcy are applied at a macro level. Three kinds of
restructuring are considered in broad outline: a debt–equity swap, a temporary capital
injection, and a debt write-down. How these might work in practice – at least for banks
– has been vividly demonstrated in the recent restructuring of bank balance sheets in
the UK and US; see Table 1 in the Conclusion.
3.2.1. Debt–Equity swap
Capital restructuring under Chapter 11 frequently involves an exchange of debt for an
equity share, so lenders become owners, relieving the borrower of collateral require-
ments and interest payment obligations (Zingales, 2008). In Figure 5, for example, the
excess debt EF owed to the wealth owner could be swapped for equity of the same value.
(To avoid the moral hazard problem of equity ownership in the KM framework,
however, an agency taking up such ownership rights would need ways of enforcing
payment beyond those available to private creditors.)
3.2.2. Capital injection
A key element of the financial support for the UK financial sector has been the pro-
vision of capital injections in preference shares or unsecured debt. How can this avoid a
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meltdown if it is designed to be temporary? The answer, broadly speaking, is by
checking the de-leveraging process that follows a shock to net worth and so limiting the
negative externality of asset sales.
In terms of the canonical model we use, let deep-pocket lenders provide unsecured
financing C when the shock occurs, to be repaid as RC one period later, where R is the
gross market rate of interest. (To avoid the moral hazard problem of unsecured
lending, assume also that the capital injection is arranged through the agency of the
government, which has ways of enforcing payment beyond those available to private
creditors.)
This extra capital will shift the financing constraint up from FF, as shown in Figure 6,
giving first-period equilibrium at A0 and so avoiding insolvency. By providing financial
support to indigent small businesses in this way, their immediate need for liquidity has
been reduced, as Krishnamurthy (forthcoming) puts it, so the fire-sales equilibrium is
less dire. (The disposal schedule shown as D 0D 0 in Figure 4 will be shifted downwards,
checking the fall in prices.) Some of the capital injections provided to the financial
sector have, in fact, been repaid fairly promptly on both sides of the Atlantic. Figure 6
illustrates a special case where borrowers are able to repay the temporary finance with
interest in the very next period.16
3.2.3. Loan write-downs
What about debt forgiveness? A loan write-down is another way of avoiding the





















Fig. 6. A Capital Injection to Avert Armageddon
16 Repayment will of course slow down the rate of acquisition, as shown in the Figure.
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We need bankruptcy reform allowing for homeowners to write down the
value of their homes and stay in their houses, in addition to the help that the
current legislation proposes. [Furthermore], the government could assume
part of the mortgage, taking advantage of the lower interest rate at which it
has access to funds and its greater ability to demand repayment. In return for
the lower interest rate – which would make housing more affordable – it
could demand from the homeowner the conversion of the loan into a
recourse loan (reducing the likelihood of default), and from the original
holders of the mortgage, a write down of the value of the mortgage to say
90% of the current market price.
3.3. Monetary Policy: Emergency Rate Cuts
Cu´rdia and Woodford (2008) recommend a prompt cut in policy rates to offset
financial frictions, and the model we use confirms that reducing the real interest rate
when a bubble bursts – and for a while thereafter17 – should, in principle, help to limit
the fire-sales at the root of the crisis. But how reliable is this remedy?
The positive potential of cutting the interest rate is illustrated in Figure 7, where
the threat of insolvency posed by a bursting bubble is headed off and the system








































Fig. 7. Cheap Credit Can Help
17 Quite a long time, if Japanese experience is any guide.
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recovers, as shown by the path labelled B, A, AT, E. (Note that the Figure now
includes the stable path (S 0S 0) and equilibrium (E 0) associated with a permanently
lower level of interest rates (R 0<R); and an integral curve II associated with this
equilibrium.).
By construction, the lowering of the interest rates to R 0 for T periods after the bubble
bursts at B should prevent insolvency, with initial equilibrium at point A: and return to
equilibrium will be achieved providing it takes T periods to travel from A to AT, i.e. to
travel along the integral curve II from its intersection with the disposal schedule DD
to its intersection with the stable path SS. (But if the bubble was larger, at point B 0 for
example, this would not avert insolvency: a longer duration or a deeper cut of the
interest rate would be called for.)
Though the analysis seems to provide substantial support for Cu´rdia and Woodford
(2008), the efficacy of rate cuts is hobbled by two factors.18 First, of course, due to the
zero-bound on nominal rates, there is only so much cutting that the central bank can
do! Second – and just as important – the benefit of crisis cuts in policy rates may not be
passed on to small businesses.
In an environment with intermediaries, agency problems can easily arise:19 and the
easing of monetary policy in a crisis may well be offset by an increase in risk aversion by
banks. If banks retain the benefits for themselves – increasing their margins so as to
recapitalise, for example – then, as Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003, pp. 126–8) point out,
the easing of policy rates will be like pushing on a string.
The optimistic results attributed to rate cuts come with an important caveat: that
monetary economics without banking is like the Macbeths banquet without the ghost
of Banquo!
4. Conclusion
By adding an asset bubble to a canonical model of highly leveraged businesses, we
have highlighted the vicious downward spiral that may develop when asset prices
begin to fall and have outlined a variety of measures that may be used to check this –
with the government stepping in because of the externalities and moral hazard
involved. Emergency action to restore and restructure balance sheets is not unusual in
emerging markets facing financial crisis, in Thailand for instance,20 and in Argentina
(where dollar bank loans of small businesses were pesified by law soon after the peso
collapsed in early 2002). But it stands in sharp contrast to the view from conventional
models – that the effects of a worsening of financial intermediation are likely to be
limited and can be handled by interest rate cuts alone.
Besides cutting interest rates as far as they can, the authorities in both the US and
UK have of course undertaken extraordinary financial interventions, amounting in
18 For emerging markets, where dollarised debts are a potent source of balance sheet shocks, cutting
interest rates in a crisis is usually not an option for external reasons – strengthening the case for Chapter
11-style restructuring procedures, both domestically (Furman and Stiglitz, 1998; Miller and Stiglitz, 1999) and
internationally (Stiglitz, 2006, Ch. 7).
19 As discussed in Hellman et al. (2000), for example.
20 As discussed in Edison et al. (2000).
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total to around three quarters of GDP – interventions that have more than doubled the
size of central bank balance sheets – as shown in Table 1.
Three items are of particular note from the balance sheet perspective adopted in
this article. First the asset purchases which include overt purchase of corporate debt, as
well as indirect support via portfolio reallocation – as when the Central Bank buys
government debt from financial institutions, allowing them to take on more corpo-
rate debt. Asset purchases in the US, including Mortgage Backed Securities, amount
to over 3 trillion dollars, almost a third of the total support provided. This will
include purchases under the provisions of the original $700 billion TARP proposal
made by Mr Paulson. For the UK, the figures include purchases under the Asset
Purchase Facility designed to provide continued support in the form of Quantitative
Easing once interest rates had reached their effective lower limit. Official purchases
of troubled assets are, of course, designed to limit the fall in the price of the assets
involved, providing liquidity to those in need; see Krishnamurty (2009) and Figure 4
above.21
Second the capital injections, amounting to between 4% and 5% of GDP in both
countries. These would seem to correspond broadly-speaking to the Chapter 11 style
intervention described above – officially coordinated balance sheet support designed to
prevent industry-wide insolvency. It is interesting to note that – despite the initial focus
on asset purchases in the US – such capital injections constitute a larger fraction of the
total support in the US than in the UK.
Table 1
Size of Financial System Support Measures (Trillions, local currencies)
United Kingdom United States
Jan. Latest Jan. Latest
2007 2009 2007 2009
Available central bank support
Current direct lending to financial institutions 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.44
Asset purchases and other loans – 0.15 – 3.32
Collateral swaps – 0.19 – 0.20
Central bank currency swap lines – No limit – No limit
Available government support
Guarantees of financial institutions liabilities – 0.37 – 2.08
Insurance of financial assets – 0.46 – 3.74
Capital injections to banks and special purpose
vehicles
– 0.06 – 0.70
Increase in public sector support – 1.26 – 10.44
Memo: US dollar amount – 2.06 – 10.44
Percentage of GDP – 88% – 73%
Memo: Actual size of central banks balance sheet 0.09 0.22 0.91 2.09
Percentage of GDP 6 15 7 15
Source. Bank of England Financial Stability Report (2009, June, p.20).
21 To relate these figures to the KM model, one would have to treat the financial intermediaries as raising
funds for Small Business and consolidate these two sectors; likewise, to consolidate the Government with the
deep-pocket investors.
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Finally, current direct lending to financial institutions, in the top line of the Table, which
has eased credit conditions by broadening the range of collateral accepted by the
central bank (Krishnamurthy, forthcoming).
This official support has been largely directed at the financial sector itself;
and Bean (2009) concludes his Schumpeter Lecture with a call to develop macro-
economic models including financial intermediation, replete with distorted
incentives and problems of information. Simple iconic models may be useful,
meantime, to study the implosive dynamics of systems under stress and how to check
them.22
University of Warwick and Columbia University
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